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June 6, 1582 (departure from Takamatsu; arrival at Yamazaki around June 13)
From Bitchū Takamatsu (Okayama) via Numa Castle, Himeji, Akashi, and Amagasaki to Yamazaki (on the Yamashiro–Settsu border)
Forces
Hashiba Hideyoshi's army
The Mōri side (the party to the truce)
About 14 min read
On the 2nd day of the 6th month of Tenshō 10 (1582), Oda Nobunaga was killed by Akechi Mitsuhide at Honnō-ji in Kyoto (the Honnō-ji Incident). Hashiba Hideyoshi, then campaigning against the Mōri in the Chūgoku region on Nobunaga's orders, was facing the Mōri with Bitchū Takamatsu Castle under a flooding siege. On learning of the incident he made peace with the Mōri and turned his army back toward Kyoto. Leaving Takamatsu on the 6th day of the 6th month, he is said to have covered about 200 km in roughly ten days and reached Yamazaki by the 13th. This is the "Chūgoku Ōgaeshi" (the great return from the Chūgoku).
All dates are in the lunisolar calendar; the "date" field uses the 6th day of the 6th month with the same numbers. The source article (serai.jp) gives the itinerary as Takamatsu Castle on the 6th, via Numa Castle and Himeji, Akashi on the 9th, Amagasaki on the 11th, and Yamazaki on the 13th, and this entry follows it.
To avoid overlap with the existing entries on the Siege of Bitchū Takamatsu Castle and the Battle of Yamazaki, this entry focuses on movement, information, logistics, and coordination with Hideyoshi's brother Hidenaga.
On Nobunaga's orders Hideyoshi had been advancing in the Chūgoku region since around 1577. In 1582 he moved into Bitchū and besieged Takamatsu Castle, held by Shimizu Muneharu. The castle lay in low wet ground, and Hideyoshi is said to have drawn in water to isolate it. The Mōri sent relief forces under Mōri Terumoto, Kikkawa Motoharu, and Kobayakawa Takakage, and the armies faced each other. Hideyoshi had asked Nobunaga for reinforcements, and Nobunaga himself is said to have planned to take the field.
Amid this, the incident of the 2nd day of the 6th month occurred. At first very few were in a position to know of it.
It is generally said that Hideyoshi learned of the incident between the night of the 3rd and the 4th. The exact time and the route by which the news arrived differ by source and are not settled.
A widely told account holds that a secret messenger sent by Mitsuhide to the Mōri strayed into Hideyoshi's camp and was captured, or was caught in the Hashiba watch. As a result, news of Nobunaga's death did not reach the Mōri, and Hideyoshi is said to have held the information first. The anecdote appears mostly in later military chronicles, however, and its reliability is limited. Some argue the Mōri learned of it fairly early, and evaluations differ.
Hideyoshi negotiated peace through the Mōri's diplomat-monk Ankokuji Ekei and others. On the 4th, Shimizu Muneharu is said to have killed himself aboard a small boat on condition that the garrison be spared. His seppuku is said to have been one of the terms of the truce. Border arrangements covering Bitchū, Hōki, Mimasaka, and other provinces are reported, but details differ by source.
With the truce, Hideyoshi reduced worry about his rear and could turn his army east. A story is also told that Kikkawa Motoharu urged pursuit but Kobayakawa Takakage restrained him; this too comes from later compilations and cannot be called certain.
Hideyoshi's army is said to have left Takamatsu on the 6th. It first entered Numa Castle in Bizen (now in Higashi Ward, Okayama), which lay in the territory of his ally, the Ukita, and served as a base for rest and preparation. From there it headed for Himeji.
The distance from Takamatsu to Himeji is about 70 to 80 km. The army is said to have covered it in a short time, reaching Himeji around the 7th. Himeji was Hideyoshi's own castle, and he needed to reorganize there.
A well-known anecdote says that at Himeji he distributed stored gold, silver, and rice to his men. It appears in accounts such as the Kawasumi Taikōki, but these are later narratives and the details should be treated cautiously.
On the 9th the army reached Akashi, and continuing east it arrived at Amagasaki on the 11th. Amagasaki lies in Settsu, already at the gateway to the Kinai. Here warriors of Settsu such as Ikeda Tsuneoki, Nakagawa Kiyohide, and Takayama Ukon are said to have joined at Hideyoshi's call. Mitsuhide meanwhile sought allies but is said not to have gathered them as hoped.
On the 13th the army reached Yamazaki and faced Akechi Mitsuhide's force, the end point of the march. The battle at Yamazaki is not this entry's subject; see the entry on the Battle of Yamazaki.
Moving an army said to number in the tens of thousands over a short time posed a great logistical problem. Food, horses, and lodging had to be arranged, and failure would have made the march impossible.
Hideyoshi is said to have ordered preparations for hot meals and horses along the route. Harima, his own domain, presumably functioned as a well-ordered supply base, and cooperation in the territory of his ally, the Ukita, was also essential. Yet contemporary primary sources on these measures are scarce and the account relies heavily on later narratives.
It is also said that the army shed its armor and hurried in light order, but whether reliable sources support this is debated. Some see the movement as one of units advancing in stages rather than the whole army discarding equipment.
Hideyoshi's brother Hashiba Hidenaga was the central aide in his corps. In the Ōgaeshi he is said to have acted with Hideyoshi and played an important role in command and communication, though the specifics differ by source.
Commonly the division of labor is explained as Hideyoshi directing military and diplomatic matters while Hidenaga handled army operations and coordination within the camp. In a large march, practical work such as communication between van and rear, allocation of lodging, and distribution of food decides the outcome, and a trusted aide like Hidenaga may well have contributed to smoothness.
Kuroda Kanbei (Yoshitaka), regarded as Hideyoshi's strategist, is also said to have taken part in the truce talks and advised him, but most of Kanbei's specific words and deeds derive from later biographies and call for caution.
Several factors are cited: the speed of decision once the news arrived; the quick truce with the Mōri; support from Harima, Bizen, and allied territory; and the choice of Kinai warriors to side with Hideyoshi rather than Mitsuhide.
Some recent discussion raises the theory that Hideyoshi knew of the incident in advance or that the return was prepared beforehand, but these lack firm evidence and are not adopted here. Distances, days, and troop numbers vary by account, and "about 200 km in about ten days" is best treated as an approximation.
Within the scope of the source used, no reliable record shows a particular famous sword deeply involved in the march itself. In connection with swords one can say only that Shimizu Muneharu's seppuku has been told as an emblem of the warrior's final conduct in the Sengoku period, and that, as Hideyoshi won at Yamazaki, took the lead in the Oda regime, and later became ruler of the realm, famous swords gathered to him. That, however, belongs to later developments and is not a direct result of the Ōgaeshi.
The Chūgoku Ōgaeshi is remembered as one of the most famous forced marches in Japanese history. Without it the battle of Yamazaki might not have occurred, or events might have gone differently. The Kiyosu Conference on the 27th day of the same month, which settled the Oda succession, and the later unification of the country begin from this return.
The term "ōgaeshi" is said to have become established later, and how contemporaries referred to it is unclear. This entry is written within the range considered reliable given the limits of the sources.