Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Sword Hunt Edict (1588) and the Separation of Warriors from Farmers — The Impact of Social Transformation on the Distribution, Production, and Craftsmen of the Japanese Sword

What Was the Sword Hunt Edict? — The Precise Content of the 1588 Decree

On the 8th day of the 7th month of Tenshō 16 (1588), Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued the Sword Hunt edict (Katanagari). It is commonly described in textbooks as "confiscating swords from farmers," but the actual content of the edict is more complex and limited.

The main provisions of the edict can be summarized in three points.

1. Farmers (hyakushō) were prohibited from possessing weapons such as swords, wakizashi, bows, spears, and firearms.
2. The confiscated weapons were declared to be used as casting materials for the Great Buddha of Hōkōji Temple, which Hideyoshi planned to construct (under the pretext of saving farmers through the merit of the Buddha).
3. The edict emphasized the welfare benefit that farmers would "prosper for generations to come" by devoting themselves solely to agriculture.

What is notable is that this edict was not aimed at "eliminating swords from the entire country." Warriors (samurai) were still permitted to carry swords, and what was prohibited was the arming of non-warrior classes such as farmers, monks, and townspeople. The Sword Hunt edict was a class-based monopolization of ownership over "who may carry a sword," not a reduction in the total quantity of swords.

The Institutionalization of the Separation of Warriors from Farmers — The Social Transformation Completed by the Sword Hunt Edict

The Sword Hunt edict did not emerge in isolation; it was part of a series of social-order-forming policies linked to the Sōbuji edict of Tenshō 13 (1585) and the Kaizoku-teishi edict (Piracy Prohibition edict) of Tenshō 16 (1588).

In the preceding Sengoku period, farmers had repeatedly engaged in armed collective uprisings such as do-ikki, kuni-ikki, and ikko-ikki, and the class boundary between warriors and farmers was fluid. There are cases such as the Kaga Ikko-ikki (1488–1580), where an armed regime of farmers and monks persisted for nearly 100 years.

The Sword Hunt edict established the legal binary of "warriors = permitted to carry swords / farmers = prohibited from carrying swords," and this distinction became the foundation of the Edo-period shi-nō-kō-shō class system. The practice of wearing a sword as proof of status — the culture in which a warrior visibly demonstrated warrior status by wearing a sword — came to hold institutional significance after this Sword Hunt edict.

Impact on Sword Production — Restructuring of Market Structure

What changes did the Sword Hunt edict bring about in the production and distribution structure of the Japanese sword?

During the Sengoku period, sword demand was substantially driven not only by warriors but also by rural strongmen (dogō), wealthy farmers (daihyakushō), and village-level samurai (jizamurai). It was common for rural communities throughout the country to arm themselves for self-defense, equipping themselves with swords, spears, and bows as "the cost of village defense."

After the Sword Hunt edict, this rural armament demand disappeared rapidly. In particular, the rural distribution channels for uchigatana and wakizashi were severed, and the market for low-priced "kazuuchimono" (mass-produced inexpensive swords) shrank. The sword market rapidly transformed into a specialized market directed exclusively at the warrior class.

At the same time, the dignity and artistic value of the sword as a status symbol for warriors came to be emphasized, and demand for high-quality swords for appreciation and ceremonial purposes increased. As the authority of the Toyotomi and Tokugawa regimes was established, the goyō tōkō system — in which shoguns, daimyo, and hatamoto commissioned renowned masters to forge swords — was put in order, and the social standing of tōkō rose.

The Fate of Confiscated Swords — The Reality of the Great Buddha Casting Theory

The Sword Hunt edict explicitly stated that the confiscated weapons would be used for "nails and clamps for the Great Buddha of Hōkōji Temple." However, the historical evidence supporting whether the swords collected from farmers across the country were actually used as-is in casting the Great Buddha is limited.

Records in which local magistrates (daikan) and officials (bugyō) reported the implementation of the sword hunts remain, but primary sources showing detailed information on the quantity confiscated, quality, and subsequent handling are scarce. Research by medieval historians has confirmed that the actual degree of enforcement of the sword hunts varied by region: in areas under the control of daimyo it was thorough, but in mountain areas and remote islands there are confirmed cases where enforcement remained superficial.

Many of the swords possessed by farmers were poor-quality items functioning as "extensions of practical farming tools," and it is highly probable that items of qualitatively different character were mixed in among the nihontō that the sword industry circulated as merchandise.

Impact on Tōkō Operations — Changes in the Structure of Demand

In the Bunroku and Keichō eras (1590s to the early 1600s) immediately following the Sword Hunt edict, large-scale military demand from the invasions of Korea (the Bunroku-Keichō campaigns, 1592–1598) coincided, and sword demand temporarily surged. The scale of troop mobilization reached 150,000–160,000 men, and the demand for weapons procurement reached an unprecedented scale.

However, when the wars ended with the Battle of Sekigahara in Keichō 5 (1600) and the Summer Siege of Osaka in Keichō 20 (1615), military demand plunged sharply. Tōkō were compelled to shift the focus of their production from "swords for wartime demand" to "symbolic swords for a peaceful warrior society."

This shift is also one of the factors that meaningfully gave rise to the distinction between shintō (swords from the Keichō era onward) and kotō (swords from before the Keichō era). The shift in the axis of sword evaluation from "reliability in actual combat" to "the aesthetic quality of jigane and hamon, and the reputation of the tōkō" is inseparable from the series of pacification processes: the Sword Hunt edict → the separation of warriors from farmers → the Genwa enbu (1615).

Impact on Distributors — Specialization of Sword Dealers and Market Narrowing

During the Sengoku period, sword distribution was a multilayered market where itinerant merchants, markets (ichi), and sword dealers coexisted. Farmers, merchants, and temples and shrines also participated in sword transactions, but after the Sword Hunt edict, buyers were limited to the warrior class.

This "narrowing of customers" was a double-edged sword for sword distributors. The number of customers fell sharply, but the remaining customers (warriors) came to demand high-quality, high-priced swords, and the unit price per transaction rose. It was also during this period that the specialization and upgrading of sword dealers advanced, with sword dealers concentrating in major cities such as Kyoto, Edo, and Osaka.

The Legacy of the Sword Hunt Edict — Continuity with Modern Sword Regulations

The Sword Hunt edict was the first comprehensive legal regulation in history concerning the social positioning of the Japanese sword. The idea that the state determines "who may carry a sword" can be said to be the origin of "legal regulation of swords," running through the Meiji-era Sword Abolishment Edict (Haitōrei) (1876) to the modern Act for Controlling the Possession of Firearms or Swords and Other Such Weapons (Firearms and Swords Control Act, Jūtōhō).

In modern Japan, a registration certificate with the Board of Education is required for the possession and sale of Japanese swords, and possession of an unregistered sword is illegal. The starting point of this idea that "a valid reason and procedure are required to possess a sword" lies in the social norm established by the Sword Hunt edict of 1588 that "only a specific class may carry a sword."

For the sword industry, the Sword Hunt edict was not merely a historical event but a structural reform that became the distant cause of the modern market structure (demand limited to martial arts, fine arts, and collecting purposes). The "disappearance of the low-priced sword market for rural areas" of that era stands at the origin of today's brand image of "nihontō = a special possession."